

Navigating Resettlement Challenges: Socio-Economic Resilience and Human Capital Trajectories among Temporarily Displaced Persons in South Waziristan, Pakistan

¹Dr. Bashir Ahmad, ²Dr. Altaf Hussain, ³Dr. Nargis Bibi, ⁴Dr. Taimoor Khan Akhunzada

ABSTRACT

Keywords:

Temporarily Displaced Persons, Socio-economic Resilience, Human Capital, Resettlement, South Waziristan, Pakistan, Conflict-Affected Regions

Following the South Waziristan military operations in Pakistan and the followed by programs of government resettlement, this article dug to investigate the socioeconomic problems of temporarily displaced persons (TDPs). Analyzing 350 TDPs, the study concludes that the biggest obstacles to resettlement in this region are insufficient access to healthcare, education, and jobs. The demolition of homes and trend of growing urbanization among TDPs' heightens their resistance to return to their homeland. The study used descriptive statistics and binary logistic regression to gauge the main factors influencing resettlement decisions. The findings suggests an urgent need of medical and educational facilities provision, dire need for addressing the security related issues and financial assistance for house renovation to help TDPs resettle in South Waziristan.

INTRODUCTION

9/11 set off a seismic change in the global scene that was typified by the American-led invasion of Afghanistan. Particularly in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), this major event set off extensive unrest along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border that resulted in significant internal displacement. The Pakistani military started a series of actions targeted at destroying terrorist bases in response to the growing militancy and insurgent threats. Strategically important South Waziristan turned became the center of focus for these military offensives, causing millions of people to be displaced.

The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) estimates that between 2005 and 2017, more than 5.3 million people were forced to escape FATA; around 4.8 million were relocated, while many others still await return. This huge migration marked a humanitarian disaster of hitherto unheard-of magnitude and propelled Pakistan to the top of nations dealing with internally

¹ Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, ICP. Email: b.ahmad3@icp.edu.pk

² Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, ICP. Email: altaf@icp.edu.pk (Corresponding Author)

³ Assistant Professor, Jinnah College for Women, University of Peshawar. Email: nargisikram@uop.edu.pk

⁴ Visiting lecture, Development studies department, University of Peshawar. Email: taimoorakhunzada@gmail.com

displaced persons. Military operations targeted at destroying firmly established militant networks in areas like South Waziristan were the main cause of this exodus. Together with natural calamities, conflict severely disrupted local communities and drove whole people from their homes.

Notwithstanding government-led relief initiatives, Temporally Displaced Persons (TDPs) long-term resettlement remains a difficult task, especially with regard to infrastructure repair and provision of basic services. One of the most badly hit industries, education suffered as schools were destroyed or converted into temporary homes for displaced people. Many youngsters, particularly in South Waziristan, have not received appropriate education. Displaced families registered their children in schools in host towns, which made them reluctant to go back to their native areas where the infrastructure for education is still poor or nonexistent. Effective TDP resettlement depends on rebuilding educational infrastructure. But one aspect of the larger resettlement process is education; it is not everything. There are few employment possibilities in war-torn regions, which discourages displaced people even more. Many homes, confronted with the loss of their houses and an uncertain economic future, are reluctant to go back to South Waziristan without significant job possibilities. Continuous insecurity in the area aggravates the slow pace of restoration. Even with military attempts to bring back order, irregular events like roadside bombings still cause anxiety and uncertainty that makes displaced people cautious of going back. Along with massive destruction, this uncertainty has slowed down the rehabilitation process, leaving TDPs mostly dependent on government-provided relocation programs, which sometimes fall short of meeting their whole needs.

The sustained resettlement of South Waziristan depends on an all-encompassing, strategic development strategy. One crucial industry still finds great difficulty is healthcare. Further complicating relocation efforts, the loss of healthcare facilities during military operations has left displaced people without access to basic medical services including maternity care and emergency healthcare. In South Waziristan, the displacement issue reflects world patterns in which forced migration is mostly driven by conflict. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that 40 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) among around 68.5 million forcibly displaced persons worldwide are With decades of conflict and

insurgency uprooting millions, Pakistan's displacement trends also follow a similar path. Targeting militant bases in South Waziristan, military actions including Operation Al Maizan (2002–2006) and Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009) aimed. These actions caused great numbers of local citizens to be displaced even as they undermined rebel groups. For example, Operation Rah-e-Nijat by itself relocated around 424,000 people from South Waziristan. Many TDPs are unwilling to go back because of economic uncertainty and fear of militant reprisals. The FATA Research Center estimates that about 3 million FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) migrants moved to IDP camps or other areas of the nation.

Before their relocation, South Waziristan's people mostly made their living from small businesses, agriculture, and cattle. But forced migration drove many TDPs to adjust to new urban economic conditions. For some displaced families, this change has raised living standards; yet, it has also made reintegration difficult since many TDPs are now reluctant to return to their rural beginnings and have grown economically integrated into their host communities.

Resettlement attempts are further complicated by the terrible conditions of displacement and the abruptness with which many were uprooted. Many IDPs had to flee their houses without notice and travel dangerous distances to get to safety. Rebuilding their life along with continuous insecurity and limited economic possibilities in South Waziristan have resulted in a relocation catastrophe requiring constant, focused attention.

Finally, the effective resettlement of displaced people in South Waziristan calls for an all-encompassing strategy comprising not just the rebuilding of physical infrastructure but also the restoration of fundamental services including education, healthcare, and employment. The restoration of TDPs will remain illusive without focused efforts to handle these several difficulties. The continuous insecurity and economic marginalization of the area only highlight the need of a concerted development plan to enable the effective reintegration of displaced families.

Military Operations in FATA

The long and rugged 2,500-kilometer border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with its numerous mountain passes, created serious challenges for controlling militant movements. The Durand Line, the border separating the two countries, was inadequately guarded, allowing

militants to move freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This unregulated border situation allowed extremism to spread deep into Pakistan, as border monitoring remained insufficient both before and after the U.S. intervention.

The situation was further complicated by cultural and historical ties between the Pashtun communities on either side of the border. The traditional Pashtun code, Pakhtunwali, fostered strong kinship, which insurgents exploited to gain safe havens in Pakistan's tribal areas, particularly in FATA. These ties enabled militants to strengthen their presence and fuel the spread of lawlessness and insurgency.

The growing influence of militant groups had severe consequences for Pakistan, destabilizing the country socially and undermining its image on the world stage. As militancy spread from FATA to other regions, it forced the Pakistani government to reconsider its policies and take more decisive action to control the growing threat.

In response, Pakistan made a strategic shift, moving away from supporting jihadist organizations, as it had done in earlier decades, to actively combating them. This shift was driven by internal security needs and international pressure. The military launched several large-scale counterterrorism operations to restore order and weaken insurgent networks, focusing on areas where militants had established control.

Major military operations, such as Operation Al Maizan (2002-2006), Operation Zalzalā (2008), Operation Rah-e-Haq and Rah-e-Rast, Operation Rah-e-Nijat (2009), and Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014), were launched to tackle militants head-on. The most significant of these, Operation Zarb-e-Azb, saw 30,000 troops deployed in a comprehensive offensive targeting militant strongholds in North Waziristan. This operation followed a phased approach, beginning with isolating and cutting off militants, followed by clearing their territories, rebuilding the affected areas, and eventually handing control back to civilian authorities.

Key targets of Operation Zarb-e-Azb included the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Haqqani Network, Gul Bahadur group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG). These factions had entrenched themselves in the tribal regions, using North Waziristan as a base for their operations. While the operation significantly disrupted these networks, it also caused widespread displacement of civilians.

As a result, hundreds of thousands of residents were forced to flee to internally displaced persons (IDP) camps or seek refuge in host communities in nearby provinces like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The humanitarian situation deteriorated further as military operations, including airstrikes, damaged infrastructure and local economies, leaving many without homes or livelihoods. Operation Zarb-e-Azb marked a key moment in Pakistan's fight against terrorism, but its success depended on more than just military victories. Coordination between military and civilian authorities was critical, especially in rebuilding damaged areas, restoring governance, and resettling displaced populations.

However, the conflict highlighted that military solutions alone would not be enough. While these operations disrupted militant activities, long-term peace required addressing the deeper issues that fueled extremism—poverty, lack of education, and poor governance. Without tackling these root causes, militancy would likely continue to re-emerge. While military operations like Zarb-e-Azb were necessary steps in reducing militant threats, lasting peace in Pakistan's tribal regions would require ongoing development efforts. Rebuilding communities, improving governance, and reducing socio-economic disparities are essential to preventing future insurgencies and ensuring sustainable security in the region.

Pakistan's Counter-Terrorism Operations (2002-2014)

In the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, key figures from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda sought refuge along the Durand Line, which serves as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This area became a haven for these militant leaders, reconnecting with local populations who provided significant support, facilitating their operations [Sultana 2015]. As a result, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) evolved into central strongholds for these groups.

Here, they plotted various attacks aimed not only at U.S. forces stationed in Afghanistan but also at destabilizing Pakistan's national unity and sovereignty [Din 2010]. The situation became increasingly dire as these militant factions grew in strength and influence, undermining regional stability. Insurgents sought to impose their will on foreign forces and local populations, creating fear and uncertainty.

Operation Al Mizan (2002-2006)

In response to the escalating threat, Pakistan launched Operation Al Mizan to reestablish governmental authority and restore peace. This operation aimed to demonstrate the state's resolve to combat rising militancy. However, despite efforts, only a small fraction of local residents temporarily migrated; most eventually returned, indicating resilience and reluctance to abandon their communities.

Operation Rah-e-Haq and Rah-e-Rast (2007-2009)

Following Operation Al Mizan, militants adapted strategies, dispersing throughout FATA, especially in Kurram and Swat Valley. Operation Rah-e-Haq targeted groups led by Mullah Fazlullah and Sufi Muhammad in Swat Valley [Azim, Jan et al. 2018]. The Taliban enforced harsh Sharia law, including bans on polio vaccinations, women's education, and music shops, leading to public unrest.

The Pakistani government mobilized 3,000 troops to restore order and reclaim control. Military efforts proved relatively swift; within six weeks, they regained significant ground [Abbasi, Khatwani et al. 2018]. However, militants responded with vengeance, targeting schools and public facilities, resulting in over two million residents' displacement. This marked a significant humanitarian crisis.

Operation Rah-e-Nijaat (2009)

Operation Rah-e-Nijaat targeted Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and allies in South Waziristan. The operation involved 28,000 troops and JF-17 fighter jets [Khalid and Khalid]. Despite successes, over 500,000 individuals were displaced [Mohsin 2013], highlighting counter-insurgency challenges. Operation Rah-e-Nijaat was launched from three fronts: Razmak in the north, Shakai in the west, and Jandola in the east. The operation underscored the complexities of counter-insurgency efforts, as significant civilian casualties and infrastructure destruction fueled local grievances and militancy.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb (2014)

In the aftermath of Operation Rah-e-Nijaat, TTP leaders fled, complicating security. A terrorist attack on Jinnah International Airport prompted Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan [Javaid 2016]. This comprehensive military operation involved over 30,000 troops and employed a "seek, destroy, clear, and hold" strategy [Frag, Alexander et al. 2014].

Militants were driven out, many fleeing into Afghanistan. Operation Zarb-e-Azb significantly improved security conditions across Pakistan but displaced around one million people, with over 80,000 families left homeless. This highlighted the ongoing challenges of counter-terrorism operations. These operations collectively illustrate the complexities of Pakistan's counter-terrorism strategy from 2002 to 2014. Each operation aimed to confront and dismantle militant networks while revealing the intricate relationship between military action and the socio-political landscape. This underscores the need for comprehensive solutions addressing both security and the welfare of affected populations.

A Brief Review of Some Major Theories of Migration

Classical and Neo-Classical Perspectives on Migration

The classical and neo-classical theories of migration primarily perceive the movement of people as a rational response to disparities in wage levels across different geographical locations. According to these perspectives, individuals engage in a cost-benefit analysis when considering migration, assessing the potential economic advantages against the costs associated with relocation. Critical factors influencing this decision-making process include available employment opportunities, job security, and the financial implications of moving.

From this standpoint, migration is likely to occur when individuals anticipate that the expected benefits, such as increased income and better job prospects, outweigh the costs, which can include not only monetary expenses but also the potential loss of social networks and familiarity with the home environment. The classical and neo-classical frameworks provide foundational insights into the driving forces behind migration, emphasizing economic incentives as a primary motivator.

Human Capital Theory and Migration Dynamics

Human capital theory builds upon the classical perspectives by introducing the concepts of individual planning horizons and educational attainment as significant factors in migration decisions. This theoretical framework posits that the likelihood of migration is influenced by more than just wage differentials; it also encompasses elements such as a person's educational background, access to information regarding job opportunities, and their long-term outlook on career prospects.

Younger individuals, who typically possess longer planning horizons, are statistically more inclined to migrate since they have a greater potential for future earnings and career advancement. In contrast, urban areas often provide enhanced educational opportunities, attracting well-educated individuals who are in search of better compensation and professional growth. Thus, higher levels of education not only correlate with improved job prospects but also facilitate access to critical job-related information, further driving migration decisions.

Nevertheless, human capital theory acknowledges that expectations, individual risk tolerance, and prevailing conditions can act as deterrents to migration. For example, individuals may hesitate to leave their homes if they perceive limited job opportunities or unfavorable living circumstances in the destination area. This highlights the complexity of migration dynamics, suggesting that the decision to migrate is not solely based on economic incentives but is also influenced by personal and contextual factors.

Bounded Rationality and Displacement Decisions

Bounded rationality theory addresses the inherent limitations of human decision-making processes, particularly in the context of displacement. This perspective recognizes that cognitive constraints, such as limited access to information and the emotional responses stemming from traumatic experiences, can impede rational decision-making.

In areas affected by conflict and violence, individuals often prioritize their immediate safety over a detailed cost-benefit analysis. This can lead to impulsive decisions regarding migration, as the urgency to escape dangerous conditions supersedes careful consideration of potential economic outcomes. Furthermore, factors such as discrimination and social marginalization can compel individuals to leave their homes without a thorough evaluation of the implications of their migration. The bounded rationality framework underscores the need for policymakers to consider the multifaceted nature of displacement decisions. Individuals often make choices under conditions of uncertainty, fear, and trauma, which can significantly influence their behavior and decision-making processes.

New Economic Theories of Migration

New economic theories of migration present a paradigm shift from classical approaches by focusing on household-level decision-making and the collective strategies employed by families in response to economic pressures. Rather than viewing migration as an isolated choice

made by individuals, these theories suggest that migration decisions are often a joint effort among household members aiming to enhance income and reduce risk.

This framework also explores the concept of relative deprivation, whereby the awareness of other households receiving remittances may motivate families to consider migration as a viable option. The observation of successful migration experiences within a community can create a ripple effect, encouraging more individuals to embark on their own migration journeys.

Hypotheses

- Experiences of displacement and resettlement significantly alter the consumption patterns of TDPs, contributing to decreased economic stability.
- Forced migration negatively impacts the educational attainment of TDPs, resulting in limited access to essential educational resources and opportunities.
- Displacement leads to a decline in the income levels of TDPs, exacerbating their economic vulnerability and instability.
- The willingness of TDPs to return to their original areas is significantly influenced by socio-economic factors, including perceived safety, availability of basic services, and access to economic opportunities.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The examination of literature on forced migration indicates that a significant portion of the economic research in this area is relatively recent. While studies on migration in general are available, the field of forced migration remains nascent, with limited scholarly work dedicated to it. Existing research primarily concentrates on cases from Rwanda, Colombia, and Northern Uganda, where forced migration occurred due to a range of sociopolitical factors. The repercussions of such migration are varied and complex.

Bozzoli and Brück (2010) argue that, over the long term, forced migration can yield positive outcomes for displaced individuals. The rationale behind these beneficial effects includes an expanded market, heightened consumer demand, potential for increased future profits, and a swifter transition from agricultural activities to modern industrial sectors. The study

emphasizes that successful long-term outcomes hinge on labor mobility; greater mobility among workers is linked to improved results. The research largely focuses on forced migration in developed nations, particularly in the aftermath of World War II, which ultimately contributed to lasting economic prosperity in Europe. Conversely, studies concerning forced migration in developing countries illustrate severe consequences for both migrants and host communities. In these contexts, displaced families often experience stagnation in income and consumption levels, while host communities face mixed impacts, such as the influx of inexpensive foreign labor and disruptions in local labor markets.

In a significant study by Bauer, Braun et al. (2013), the exodus of Germans from Europe—an event marked by the forced displacement of 17% of the population—is analyzed. This research compares the economic situations of first-generation and second-generation migrants 25 years post-displacement. Findings reveal that, despite the passage of time, first-generation migrants still face economic disadvantages relative to their native counterparts. Specifically, first-generation displaced men and women report incomes that are 5.1% and 3.8% lower, respectively, than those of their native peers, with around 10% of displaced women not participating in the labor force at all. Interestingly, in the agricultural sector, first-generation migrants seem to earn higher incomes compared to their native counterparts. The study also found that young displaced males and females were significantly less likely—by 47% and 67%, respectively—to engage in agricultural work compared to native individuals. Overall, the conclusion is that forced displacement inflicts long-term negative impacts on displaced households.

Ibáñez and Vélez (2008) investigate the connections between civil conflict, forced migration, and their consequences in Colombia, which has one of the largest populations of displaced individuals, totaling around 2.9 million due to ongoing civil unrest. The study identifies violence and insecurity in migrants' places of origin as major catalysts for forced migration. Welfare losses resulting from displacement are estimated to account for 37% of rural consumption overall, with poorer families suffering even greater losses—up to 80% of their aggregate consumption.

Fiala (2015) analyzes the economic effects of forced migration in Uganda, where ethnic and political violence prompted widespread displacement, with around 1.6 million people forced

to relocate to internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. The study seeks to determine whether displaced households lag behind those that remained in their homes. The findings indicate that, while displacement initially led to a considerable decrease in consumption—35% lower than that of non-displaced households—there was some recovery in consumption and wealth upon returning home. Nonetheless, these displaced families still fell short of their non-displaced counterparts. The impact of displacement varied, with poorer families experiencing greater losses in consumption and assets than wealthier families, who tended to recover more successfully.

Mels, Derluyn et al. (2010) assessed the psychological effects of forced migration on adolescents in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where ethnic violence and massacres in 1999 resulted in the displacement of over half a million people. This study examines the mental health impacts on three groups: IDPs, returnees, and non-displaced Congolese adolescents. It found that IDPs experienced higher levels of post-traumatic stress disorder compared to returnees, who themselves had encountered more traumatic events than their non-displaced peers, indicating that IDPs faced significantly greater risk factors for mental health issues.

Bozzoli and Brück (2010) also explored the implications of war-related displacement on child health in Uganda in 2007. The research found that child morbidity rates were similar in both IDP camps and among returnees. However, conditions in the camps—characterized by poor sanitation, lack of clean drinking water, overcrowding, and inadequate cooking facilities—significantly exacerbated health issues for children.

Sarvimäki, Uusitalo et al. (2009) examined the experiences of 0.43 million individuals who were forcibly displaced. Utilizing logit and probit models, the study compared outcomes for displaced persons with those who remained in their communities during the conflict. It concluded that while pre-war economic differences were minimal, lifetime income for men significantly increased compared to non-displaced individuals, whereas women benefited less from displacement. Factors such as poor economic conditions, societal marginalization, lack of industrial opportunities, and insufficient economic institutions contributed to a rise in militancy and internal strife (Chaudhry 2014).

Ahmad, Kazmi et al. (2011) conducted a study focusing on stressful life events among internally displaced persons in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This research www.ijbmsarchive.com

identified correlations between stressful experiences and the internally displaced population, reporting significant losses for men in terms of job, income, and property—35.6%, 41.7%, and 61% respectively. Notably, women reported experiencing a higher frequency of stressful events compared to men, and IDPs also faced various resettlement challenges. The extensive internal displacement in FATA has created vulnerabilities, necessitating intervention from both state and non-state actors to safeguard the socioeconomic conditions of IDPs. Amir-ud-Din and Malik (2016) highlighted the gap between the needs of vulnerable IDPs and existing social protections.

Tariq, Khan et al. (2020) explored the political, social, and economic repercussions of the war on terror in Pakistan. Employing qualitative methods, the study assessed how this conflict influenced foreign direct investment, agriculture, and tourism. It found that all these growth indicators were adversely affected by the war on terror, with the energy crisis and the global financial crisis of 2008 particularly exacerbating Pakistan's economic troubles.

Further research by Alam, Akram et al. (2017) and Farooq (2014) reached similar conclusions, noting that terrorism and foreign direct investment tend to move in opposing directions, which in turn hampers economic growth. Alam (2013) examined the relationship between terrorism and stock market development, finding a significant negative correlation in the long run, though this effect was not evident in the short term. The study did acknowledge limitations due to the lack of consistent annual data on terrorist incidents.

Gupta, Clements et al. (2004) investigated the fiscal repercussions of armed conflict in developing and underdeveloped countries, revealing that such conflicts led to increased defense spending. This diversion of government resources from social and economic development to military expenditure has been detrimental to economic growth, illustrating how terrorism adversely impacts overall economic performance.

Another analysis by Yaseen and Awan (2017) and Ismail and Amjad (2014) focused on the determinants of terrorism, establishing a long-term relationship between socio-economic indicators and terrorist activities. Using Johansen co-integration and Error Correction Models, the research indicated that factors like per capita income, inflation, and poverty were significant short-term predictors of terrorism, whereas literacy and unemployment were found to be less impactful. In the long run, inflation, per capita income, and literacy emerged as

crucial determinants of terrorism, while unemployment and income inequality proved to be insignificant.

Gul, Hussain et al. (2010) analyzed the effects of terrorism on the KSE market, the foreign exchange market, and the interbank market. Their findings indicated that all three markets suffered negative impacts from terrorism, with the KSE market being the most severely affected. Malik and Zaman (2013) employed Granger Causality and Co-integration tests to explore the short- and long-term relationships between macroeconomic indicators and terrorism, concluding that political instability, inflation, and poverty are significant contributors to terrorist activities, while unemployment and income inequality do not exhibit long-term relationships with terrorism in Pakistan.

In a related study, Mehmood (2014) assessed that real per capita income in Pakistan declined by 33% from 1973 to 2008, with a direct loss of 6.32 billion USD attributed to the costs of the war on terror. Using descriptive statistical analysis, Msunaza Yaseen et al. (2017) investigated the economic impacts of war and future perceptions of terrorism in Pakistan, finding that 76% of respondents believed it was crucial to reduce terrorism in the coming decades, while 24% felt that eliminating it entirely was impossible. Moreover, 94% of participants acknowledged that terrorism had negatively affected foreign direct investment, and 82% reported that it had increased business costs. Additionally, 88% believed that terrorism had led to higher defense budgets and a loss of investor confidence in Pakistan.

Rauf, Nadeem et al. (2011) conducted a study on hepatitis B and C screening among IDPs in Swat, Pakistan, concluding that the prevalence rates of these diseases were at 9.66% among this population due to the recent war against terrorism.

Shahbaz, Shabbir et al. (2013), discussed the casual relationship between terrorism and economic growth in Pakistan. The study uses capital and trade openness as potential variables to investigate into the matter through Granger Causality and Co-integration approach. The study revealed that there exists a negative correlation between terrorism and economic growth while, trade openness and economic growth are positively correlated (ud Din, Ullah et al. 2017) analyzed the UN guiding principles and securing health protection as independent and dependent variables respectively for the IDPs of North Waziristan. The paper concluded that mismanagement and inadequate health services were provided in IDPs camps in Bannu. It was www.ijbmsarchive.com

also concluded that other facilities like education, health and living facilities were not according to the principles of equity. (Chughtai 2013) analyzed the impact of rising terrorism on socio-economic culture of FATA by using the descriptive statistical techniques. The study concluded that the residence of such areas is afflicted by militancy and still there is a lack of effective policy for the government to intervene in the near future.

Gaps in Literature

Though a lot of research has been done on forced migration, there is still a great knowledge vacuum about Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDP) socioeconomic effects and human capital paths in South Waziristan, Pakistan. Previous studies have mostly concentrated on the experiences of displaced people living abroad, therefore ignoring the particular situation involving TDPs in South Waziristan. Given the immediate socio-economic resilience and human capital paths of TDPs during resettlement operations, the complexity of conflict-induced displacement in Pakistan calls for in-depth study.

Previous research has given macroeconomic consequences and long-term repercussions top priority, therefore excluding the socioeconomic difficulties TDPs experience. Particularly in the Pakistani context, educational inequalities experienced by TDPs pre- and post-migration remain underresearched. Although the material now in publication shows varied results for displaced people in industrialized vs developing nations, the subtleties of educational paths among Pakistani TDPs demand more research.

Limited empirical data on TDPs' readiness to resettle in their initial impacted areas complicates informed policy decisions and support systems. Developing good reintegration plans requires an awareness of TDPs' points of view on resettlement. Moreover, the particular socioeconomic effects of displacement on income levels and consumption among Waziristan's TDPs remain understudied, therefore hindering the development of focused treatments meant to minimize economic effects.

By looking at the intricate interactions among displacement, socioeconomic well-being, education, and resettlement willingness among TDPs in South Waziristan, this study fills in some of the research voids and supports the larger conversation on forced migration in conflict-torn areas.

METHODOLOGY

Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Willingness to Return

Knowing the reasons behind migration calls for a sophisticated study of both non-financial and economic ones. Usually involving a methodical cost-benefit analysis, economic displacement sees households weigh the benefits against the drawbacks of moving. On the other hand, when displacement is motivated by violence, the decision-making process becomes more instantaneous and survival-oriented, usually leaving little opportunity for economic concerns. Conflict often leaves households unable to provide comprehensive analyses of economic aspects. Resettlement decisions mostly rely on the lack of violence, the availability of basic amenities including education and healthcare, and the guarantee of job security. Families are more prone to think about going back to their original homes when they feel the expected advantages will exceed those of being displaced. This structure underlines the need of evaluating the trade-offs between living in a displaced situation and returning home. Economic possibilities, current social networks, cultural links, personal security, and availability to essential amenities could be among the elements guiding this choice. This paradigm provides a methodical technique to examine return willingness by realizing the interaction among psychological, social, and financial aspects. It emphasizes the difficulty in migration and resettlement choices and the importance of a thorough knowledge of the reasons behind displaced people.

This study's conceptual framework seeks to explore the elements affecting the willingness of temporarily displaced people (TDPs) in South Waziristan to go back to their respective homes. Knowing the dynamics of migration calls for a thorough study of both non-financial and financial reasons. Usually involving a methodical cost-benefit analysis, economic displacement sees households balance the benefits and drawbacks of moving. When displacement results from violence, on the other hand, the decision-making process becomes more instantaneous and survival-oriented, sometimes leaving little opportunity for careful economic considerations. Due of their urgency, households often find themselves unable to perform thorough analyses of economic elements in conflict settings. Resettlement decisions mostly depend on the security environment since families are more inclined to contemplate going back to their natural habitats when they believe the expected advantages of doing so exceed those of being displaced.

Important factors guiding this choice are the lack of violence, the provision of basic amenities including education and healthcare, and guarantee of employment stability. This paradigm underlines the need of evaluating the trade-offs between being in a displaced state and going back to her house. The interaction of economic possibilities, current social networks, cultural ties, personal security, and access to fundamental services complicates the decision-making process even further. This paradigm offers a disciplined method to examine the willingness to return by realizing the complexity of migration and resettlement decisions. One can symbolically depict the relationships among predicted utilities as follows:

$$EU_j > EU_d$$

EU_j = is the expected utility at the place of origin:

EU_d = is the expected utility of the household at the displaced location.

The above EU_j can be reformulated as:

$$EU_j = T_i + \omega_j$$

In this context, T_i represents the observable utility, while ω_j denotes the random effect with a mean of zero and constant variance. The observable utility reflecting a household's willingness to resettle is influenced by various factors. The observable utility reflecting a household's willingness to resettle is shaped by multiple influencing factors. Usually only when peace is rebuilt in their place of origin can households think about resettlement. The relocation choice depends much on access to basic amenities such communication infrastructure, education, and healthcare. Furthermore greatly affects this decision the availability of job prospects in the future resettlement region. Households are prone to migrate to places where such possibilities are present since they often hunt for employment. Lower migration rates can result from a lack of commercial activity and job possibilities, however, in areas devastated by conflict. Household factors influencing the choice to resettle also include family size, income level, current family ties in conflict areas, and property ownership, therefore influencing socioeconomic status. Consequently, one might depict the apparent usefulness or will to resettle as follows:

$$T_j = f (Y_j + HC_j + H_j + ED_j + MC_j)$$

Y_j = Income of the household

HC_j = Household characteristics


H_j = House ownership at the place of origin

ED_j = Household education level

MC_j = Migration cost

As already said, several elements affect the choice of residence for a household. Of them, the security situation at the planned location takes first importance. Residents are more likely to go back to their original houses when tensions reduce and the neighborhood is viewed as safe. The condition of their homes in the zone of war is still another crucial factor. Many houses have been uninhabitable since military operations cause major damage. Families so usually reluctant to return until their homes have been rebuilt and judged livable. Moreover, the family size complicates the resettlement process. Usually facing higher migration expenses, larger or extended families choose to stay where they live instead of running the risk of having to return to maybe dangerous or unstable surroundings.

Theoretical structure and hypothetical foundation



Data and Descriptive Analysis

The Data

A household survey was carried out among temporarily displaced people at their present places in order to examine the socioeconomic effects of forced migration and to test the suggested hypotheses. Evaluating their inclination to go back to their natural habitats took front stage. The poll aimed at former permanent residents of the impacted areas whose socioeconomic situation has changed significantly after their displacement, therefore generating new living standards. Emphasizing the pre- and post-migration impacts, the poll asked a wide spectrum of questions on socioeconomic circumstances. 350 homes in all took part; the necessary data was acquired by means of questionnaires and interviews sent to the heads of households.

Description of variables

A thorough summary of the factors used in the survey carried out to examine the determinants of willingness to relocate among Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs) is given in the table following. Understanding the socio-economic background of respondents both before and after migration depends much on each variable.

Table 1: Description of variables

Variable	Description
Age	Age of the respondent. This variable is critical in assessing demographic factors that may influence the willingness to resettle, such as life stage and responsibilities.
Marital Status	Binary indicator: =1 if the respondent is married, =0 otherwise. This variable helps to understand how family dynamics may affect resettlement decisions.
Terrorists	Binary indicator: =1 if terrorist or violent groups exist in the place of origin, =0 otherwise. This factor is crucial in assessing perceived safety and security.
Military	Binary indicator: =1 if military forces are present in the place of origin, =0 otherwise. The presence of military can influence perceptions of safety and stability.
Consumption Pre-Migration	Binary indicator: =1 if the household owned transport animals at the place of origin, =0 otherwise. This reflects the level of agricultural engagement and economic activity prior to migration.

Variable	Description
Consumption Post-Migration	Binary indicator: =1 if the household owns any other important assets at the place of origin, =0 otherwise. This highlights changes in asset ownership and economic conditions post-migration.
Support_UNHCR_WFO	Binary indicator: =1 if the household received support from national/international NGOs, =0 otherwise. This variable assesses the impact of external assistance on the household's decision-making.
Employment	Binary indicator: =1 if the household expects to obtain employment if they resettle in the place of origin, =0 otherwise. This reflects economic aspirations and feasibility of resettlement.
Profession H/H (Pre-Migration)	The pre-migration profession of the household head, categorized into government/non-government jobs, labor, self-business, unemployed, or other. This helps assess the economic background and skills of the household.
Income Pre-Migration	Monthly earnings of the household head prior to migration. This variable is essential for understanding the economic conditions that influenced the decision to migrate.
Agri_Earnings	Agricultural earnings of the household head before migration. This variable is critical for understanding the reliance on agriculture as a source of income.
Current_Agri_Earnings	Current agricultural earnings of the household from the migrants' current location. This reflects any shifts in economic activity following migration.
Income Post Migration	Current income of the household after migration. This variable assesses the economic adjustment of the household in the new environment.
Migration_Affected_Income	Indicator of whether forced migration has affected the level of household earnings, reflecting the economic impact of displacement.
Automobiles (Pre-Migration)	Binary indicator: =1 if the respondent possessed automobiles before migration, =0 otherwise. This provides insight into the household's mobility and economic status.
Automobiles (Post-Migration)	Binary indicator: =1 if the respondent possesses automobiles after migration, =0 otherwise. This reflects changes in asset ownership and mobility post-displacement.
Education Level	The education level of the household/respondent, which is vital for understanding the human capital available for economic activities and community reintegration.
School-Age-Children	Binary indicator: =1 if school-age children have access to education at the place of origin, =0 otherwise. This variable reflects educational opportunities available to the next generation.
Impact on Education	Binary indicator: =1 if the household's education has been affected due to forced migration, =0 otherwise. This variable assesses the broader impacts of displacement on educational outcomes.

Variable	Description
Spending On Education (Pre-Migration)	Amount spent on family education pre-migration. This provides insight into the investment in human capital before displacement.
Spending On Education (Post-Migration)	Amount spent on family education post-migration. This reflects any changes in educational investment following displacement.
Resettlement Education	Indicates that the family does not want to resettle in the place of origin due to children admitted in the current occupied areas (1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neutral, 4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree). This captures sentiments regarding education as a factor in resettlement decisions.
House Ownership (Pre-Migration)	Binary indicator: =1 if the household had/has house ownership in the place of reception before migration, =0 otherwise. This assesses prior housing security.
House Ownership (Post-Migration)	Binary indicator: =1 if the household had/has house ownership in the place of reception after migration, =0 otherwise. This highlights changes in housing status post-displacement.
Health Facilities	Binary indicator: =1 if the household has access to unrestricted health services at the place of origin, =0 if access is limited or unavailable. This reflects the health infrastructure available to the household.
Luggages	Binary indicator: =1 if possession of heavy and bulky items hinders resettlement, =0 otherwise. This variable highlights logistical challenges faced by TDPs in returning to their homes.
Resettlement Cost	Indicates that TDPs do not want to resettle due to high costs, rated on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). This reflects economic barriers to resettlement.
Homes Status	Binary indicator: =1 if the migrants' homes were completely or partially destroyed due to conflict in the place of origin, =0 otherwise. This assesses the impact of conflict on housing stability.
Willingness To Resettle	Binary indicator: =1 if the respondent is willing to resettle in their place of origin, =0 otherwise. This is a key outcome variable reflecting the overall sentiment toward returning.

Important for an in-depth study of the socioeconomic and contextual elements influencing TDPs' inclination to resettle are the elements of this survey. Knowing these factors enables governments and companies to create focused interventions to assist displaced people in their efforts at reintegration and to handle the many difficulties they encounter in the post-migration scene.

Nature and Region of Displacement

There was no prior warning given to the local populace to flee, hence the forced exodus from South Waziristan was sudden and unanticipated. Starting on October 16, 2009, the military campaign against terrorists left behind Non-Custom Paid (NCP) vehicles in the impacted areas and just few days for the population to migrate to safer zones, therefore leaving behind their possessions. While territories occupied by the Wazir tribe stayed unharmed and no military action was needed, the military operation mostly aimed at areas inhabited by the Mehsud and Burki tribes. Consequently, almost 60% of the tribal district of South Waziristan was evacuated, uprooting about 400,000 people—men as well as women.

ANALYSIS

Descriptive Overview of Displacement Impact

The main conclusions on Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs) before and after migration are synthesized in the descriptive study that is presented here. The important changes in housing, income, agricultural activity, and opinions of the resettlement situation are underlined by this study.

Indicator	Before Migration	After Migration
Consumption Levels	27% spent Rs. 20-30k; 14% spent >Rs. 40k	30% spent Rs. 30-40k; 30% spent >Rs. 40k
Household Occupation	Predominantly labor-intensive, unstable jobs	Shift to self-employment and small businesses
Monthly Household Income	23% earned >Rs. 45k	34% earned >Rs. 45k
House Ownership	17% owned homes; 82% lacked ownership	69% owned homes; 29% still lacked ownership
Perception Of Peace	45% believed the region unsafe for resettlement	18% trusted it was safe for resettlement
Agricultural Earnings	64% earned Rs. 5k-20k; 18% had no agri-income	80% had no agricultural income post-migration
Perception of Consumption upon Return	N/A	64% expected lower consumption if they returned

Emphasizing changes in consumption, employment, income, and views of peace and property ownership, the study examines the socioeconomic effects of forced migration on Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs). Driven by temporary aid and new employment opportunities, displaced households noted higher spending and income following migration.

- Occupational Transitions: Migration helped to move from unstable work to self-employment, therefore fostering resilience and local economic growth.
- Ownership Dynamics: Although original properties were lost, many bought homes after moving, therefore reducing the desire to return to conflict regions.
- View of Peace: While some immigrants felt more protected following their migration, security concerns remained as a barrier to resettlement.
- Agricultural Decline: Many people gave up farming for other careers since displacement seriously affected their means of life.
- Implications of Policy: Policies should give job creation, market development, and infrastructure supporting returning migrants top priority.
- Initiatives helping displaced people in entrepreneurship and skill development could help to increase long-term economic stability.
- To enable safe, voluntary repatriations, local security issues must be addressed via inclusive peacebuilding and community development.
- Emphasizing the need of long-lasting, adaptable policy measures to help displaced people, this study shows the complex link between forced migration and economic and social systems.

Table 02: *Descriptive statistics for the variable used in econometric analysis*

List of Variables	Mean	Std. Deviation	Maximum	Minimum
Existence of terrorists groups	0.85	0.362	1	0
Expected support from UNCHCR WFO	0.45	0.498	1	0
Expects to obtain employment.	0.20	0.403	1	0
Current agriculture earnings	4.45	1.228	5	1
Current earnings of household	193.28	13056.41	50000	10000
Access to school/college	0.27	0.442	1	0
Spending on education	78.01	5912.169	20000	0
Possession of house in settled districts	0.85	0.362	1	0
Access to health services	0.38	0.486	1	0
Resettlement cost for TDPs	0.55	0.499	1	0
Migrants homes has been completely destroyed	0.79	0.411	1	0
There still exist military / paramilitary forces	0.86	0.350	1	0
Monthly consumptions pre migration	149.1	13331.65	50000	10000
Monthly consumption post migration	210.2	10065.24	50000	10000
Migration has positively affected consumption	2.32	0.843	5	1
Earnings of the household pre migration	184.54	12536.02	50000	10000
Agricultural earnings pre migration	7942.8	5222.515	20000	0

Did you changed business after migration	1.22	0.413	2	1
Had you possessed automobiles pre migration	1.80	0.398	2	1
Had you possessed automobile post migration	1.66	0.475	2	1
Spending on education pre migration	65.52	4333.824	20000	0
Had you possessed house in settled districts pre migration	0.17	0.377	1	0
Heavy items causes resettlement difficult	0.49	0.501	1	0
Small household resettle quickly	0.54	0.499	1	0
Willingness to resettle	0.69	0.469	1	0

Based on the average values of important variables, the following interpretation offers understanding of the several elements influencing Temporarily Displaced Persons' (TDPs') motivation to return to their native areas:

- With a high mean of 0.85 for the category of Existence of Terrorist Groups, a noteworthy number of respondents believe that terrorist groups exist in their local surroundings. This view generates an environment of uncertainty and anxiety that probably discourages TDPs from thinking about resettlement. With a mean of 0.45, less than half of the respondents expect to get from the UNHCR or WFO. This ambiguity on outside help could fuel vulnerability and resistance to return. Given a low mean of 0.20 for expectations of finding employment, it is clear that many TDPs do not think they will be able to locate employment upon returning. Their readiness to resettle is much influenced by this lack of confidence. The low average agricultural income highlight the difficulties experienced by those who once depended on farming before displacement since they show a change away from farming as a profitable source of income.
- Although the average household income seems rather high, the great variation indicates that while some households are doing well, many may be having financial difficulties, therefore influencing their general economic stability. A low mean in the Access to School/College (Mean: 0.27) indicates that many TDPs have limited access to educational institutions, which may impede the development of skills necessary for economic engagement and affect decisions to resettle. The average expenditure on education is somewhat low, which could suggest financial restrictions influencing households' capacity to invest in education, so influencing long-term prospects for their children. With a high mean of 0.85 for Possession of House in Settled Districts, most of the respondents had

found accommodation in their present places, which helps to explain their unwillingness to go back to wrecked homes.

- Many TDPs may be at great risk for health issues due to only minimal access to health services, which would discourage their desire to resettle in places without sufficient medical facilities. With a mean of 0.55, the average shows that many of the respondents believe the expenses related to resettlement to be a deterrent, which shapes their choice on returning. With a high mean (Mean: 0.79), most respondents have reported total devastation of their homes, which greatly influences their readiness to go back. The great view of military presence (Mean: 0.86) supports security issues that greatly influence the resettlement decision-making process. The rise in average monthly consumption following migration (Pre-Migration Mean: 149.1; Post-Migration Mean: 210.2) shows that many TDPs have adjusted to their new surroundings, maybe increasing their living conditions despite the difficulties of relocation.
- A modest mean indicates that, reflecting changes in their financial circumstances, many TDPs feel migration has improved their spending patterns. The average income before migration shows a dependence on conventional sources of income, which contrasts with present earnings and emphasizes the need of adaptability after displacement. The high mean emphasizes the extreme shifts in livelihoods since many homes depended much on agricultural income before displacement. With a mean (Mean: 1.22), many TDPs seem to have changed their business operations in reaction to their new conditions, therefore reflecting required modifications to survive economically. The modest drop in vehicle ownership following migration (Pre-Migration Mean: 1.80; Post-Migration Mean: 1.66) suggests some loss of assets during displacement, therefore affecting mobility and economic prospects. A low average for education spending pre-migration draws attention to possible financial constraints that can influence children in TDP households's future educational possibilities. Reflecting the major change in housing status post-displacement, the low mean (Mean: 0.17) indicates that relatively few TDPs held residences in established regions before relocation.
- With considerable barriers present for many TDPs, these averages show that logistical difficulties and household size—heavy items, mean: 0.49; small households, mean: 0.54—

can affect the speed of relocation. At last, in the category of Willingness to Resettle (Mean: 0.69), a quite high mean suggests that a considerable fraction of TDPs still expresses a wish to return to their native places, dependent on improvements in safety, housing, and access to services. Means analysis demonstrates a complex interaction of elements affecting TDP inclination to return to their original areas. Important obstacles are security issues, house damage, and restricted access to work and basic services. Still, some respondents exhibit hope for post-migration adaptations, which shows in higher spending levels. Successful resettlement and reintegration of TDPs into their communities depend on addressing these issues by means of focused policies and support structures.

Statistical analysis

The data of the study support our theory that households with more education and property ownership in their place of reception are more likely to settle permanently in their new surroundings. Key factors influencing the likelihood of willingness to resettle especially are employment possibilities at the place of origin, current agricultural income, homeownership in the settled district post-migration, access to education at the place of origin, and house destruction during displacement.

These results imply that households who view better infrastructure and economic stability at their place of origin, together with access to education, are more likely to be considering returning. Conversely, as expected, factors including household income, occupation, the existence of terrorist groups, possession of big assets or bulky goods, and the general relocation expenses had no statistically significant influence on the choice to resettle. With a p-value of 0.0000 the statistical analysis produces a likelihood ratio chi-squared value of LR chi² (34) = 84, therefore suggesting that the model is statistically significant generally. With a log-likelihood of -170.4644 and a Pseudo R-squared value of 0.1995, the model likewise fits really reasonably. This implies that the model fairly forecasts the elements affecting the resettlement choices of displaced households, therefore offering a good foundation for comprehending how socioeconomic, educational, and housing-related factors affect the migration and resettlement dynamics of these groups.

While elements like wealth or occupation have less influence in the choice to return home, the results emphasize the important part that education and homeownership play in both migratory

decisions and resettlement results. Policymakers would benefit much from these revelations since they provide unambiguous proof of which elements should be given top priority in initiatives meant to support displaced people and enable resettlement.

Econometric Analysis

The determinants affecting Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs) to decide whether or not to return were experimentally investigated using the survey data gathered from sampling of displaced communities. This part of the research used a general linear regression method, more especially the binary logistic model. Table 1 above shows the definitions of the regression variables; Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables. This model enables us to investigate the elements influencing TDP decision-making on their possible return to their own country.

Analysis of Factors Influencing the Resettlement Decision

A statistical technique called binary logistic regression, models the link between a binary dependent variable (that of willingness to resettle). The binary character of the dependent variable suggests that just two alternative results are there: either not wanting to resettle (coded as 0) or willing to resettle (coded as 1). Considering the values of the independent variables, logistic regression forecasts the likelihood of one of these two results. For every unit change in the predictor variable, the coefficients in the model convey the log-odds of the event occurring.

Table 03: Binary Logistic Regression For The Probability Of Willingness To Resettle

Dependent variable (Willingness to resettle)	Coefficients	P_ Value
Constant	-1.69603	0.227
Existence of terrorist groups in place of origin	-0.20869	0.607
Level of consumption before migration	-1.6E-05	0.171
Level of consumption after migration	2.35E-05	0.128
Support form UNCHR_WFO	-0.58182	0.044
obtain employment at place of origin	-1.25625	0.00
Household profession pre migration		
Business	-0.07374	0.881
Labor	0.132013	0.793
Unemployed	-0.49625	0.427
any other	-1.12134	0.218
Household profession post migration		
Business	0.190178	0.74

Labor	-0.02043	0.973
Unemployed	0.859864	0.233
any other	-0.83337	0.372
Earnings before migration	7.12E-06	0.573
Annual agriculture earnings post migration	2.27E-05	0.406
Current agriculture earnings	0.317341	0.002
Current earnings of the household	-3.84E-06	0.736
Household education level		
Primary	-0.87244	0.027
Middle	-0.61731	0.149
High	0.080666	0.891
Degree	-0.11054	0.85
Children have access to education in place of origin	-0.67123	0.027
Spending on education pre migration	3.34E-06	0.914
Spending on education post migration	-4.01E-06	0.875
House ownership in place of reception		
Pre migration /Yes	0.134106	0.744
House ownership in place of reception		
Post migration/Yes	1.09684	0.003
Access to health services in place of origin	-0.64234	0.032
Heavy luggage items causes resettlement difficult		
small household resettle quickly	-0.11646	0.693
IDP's resettlement cost		
Agree	0.337168	0.378
Neutral	0.659878	0.199
Disagree	0.303462	0.544
strongly disagree	-0.38274	0.35
Current home status (destroyed/safe)	0.787323	0.018

With a p-value of 0.227, the constant term in the model is statistically negligible and implies it has little effect on resettlement. Still, certain independent factors offer important information:

- Though not statistically significant (p-value = 0.607), the presence of terrorist groups at the location of origin has a negative influence (-0.20869). This implies that although the existence of terrorist groups is expected to negatively affect resettlement, in this model the decision is not significantly influenced by them. With a coefficient of -0.58182 (p-value = 0.042), UNHCR/WFP's negative and major influence on the willingness to resettle is evident.

- Households getting such support are less inclined to return, suggesting that by offering stability in displacement, outside help may lessen the drive to relocate. Resettlement is much predicted by employment at the place of origin.
- With a significant negative coefficient of -1.25625 (p-value = 0.00), the variable suggests that households without work prospects at their place of origin are substantially less likely to migrate. Therefore, decisions on resettlement depend much on economic possibilities. With a coefficient of 0.317341 and a p-value of 0.002, current agricultural earnings reveal a positive and notable influence that indicates households engaged in agriculture post-migration are more likely to return. Constant agricultural activity offers financial security that promotes resettlement.
- Resettlement also depends on degree of education. Lowering educational attainment makes resettlement more difficult, since households with primary education demonstrate a negative effect (coefficient = -0.87244, p-value = 0.027).
- On the other hand, more schooling does not statistically significantly affect anything. Another crucial consideration is children's access to education right at their area of origin. With families giving their children top priority for educational possibilities, the negative coefficient of -0.67123 (p-value = 0.027) indicates that inadequate access to education inhibits resettlement.
- With a noteworthy positive coefficient of 1.09684 (p-value = 0.003), post-migration home ownership is among the best predictors of resettlement. Homes owned by households in their present place are more likely to remain as safe housing lessens the necessity for return. Resettlement choices also depend on access to health services in the place of origin. The negative coefficient of -0.64234 (p-value = 0.032) indicates that inadequate local health facilities deter households from returning in the place of origin.
- Resettlement pace is influenced by household size; smaller households are more likely to resettle fast (coefficient = 0.87167, p-value = 0.007). Larger homes or those with plenty of luggage create logistical problems that complicate migration. At last, the condition of the present house—whether it stays unaltered or is destroyed—has a positive and noteworthy effect (coefficient = 0.787323, p-value = 0.018). Households whose houses remain safe are

more likely to return, which emphasizes the need of property security in resettlement choices.

- All things considered, the logistic regression model offers insightful analysis of the elements affecting the propensity of displaced people to resettle. Important factors are house ownership, job, education, and access to basic amenities. The statistics of the model, LR chi2 (34) = 84, p-value = 0.0000, Pseudo R2 = 0.1995, show a decent degree of explanatory power for comprehending these decisions.

Odds Ratio Analysis:

In the framework of resettlement willingness among internally displaced persons (IDPs), the odds ratio (OR) is a statistical indicator of the strength of association between two binary variables that helps evaluate how different predictor variables affect the likelihood of returning to their place of origin. Dividing the chances of the event occurring in one group by the chances of the event occurring in another determines the odds ratio. Odds itself are defined as the likelihood of the event occurring divided by the probability of it not occurring. An OR of 1 denotes no link between the predictor and the result in interpreting odds ratios, so implying that the odds of resettlement stay the same for both groups. An OR larger than 1 indicates a positive connection, therefore a change in the predictor variable corresponds with an increased risk of resettlement. On the other hand, an OR less than 1 denotes a negative connection in which a rise in the predictor variable corresponds to a lowered likelihood of resettlement.

Table 04: Determinants of willingness to resettle Odds ratio analysis.

Dependent willingness to resettle	Odds Ratio	P-value
Constant	0.18341	0.227
exist militancy terrorist groups	0.811647	0.607
Consumption before migration	0.999984	0.171
Consumption after migration	1.000024	0.128
Support from UNCHR WFO received support	0.558881	(0.044)**
obtain employment at origin	0.284721	(0.00)**
Household profession pre mig		
Business	0.928915	0.881
Labor	1.141123	0.793
Unemployed	0.60881	0.427
any other	0.325844	0.218

Household profession post_mig		
Business	1.209465	0.74
Labor	0.979781	0.973
Unemployed	2.362839	0.233
any other	0.434583	0.372
Earnings before migration	1.000007	0.573
Annual agriculture earnings	1.000023	0.406
Current agriculture earnings	1.37347	(0.002)**
Current earnings	0.999996	0.736
Household _education		
Primary	0.417929	(0.027)**
Middle	0.539395	0.149
Matriculation	1.084009	0.891
Degree	0.895346	0.85
School _age children _access		
children have access to education	0.511082	(0.027)**
Spending on education pre_mig	1.000003	0.914
Spending on edu post_mig	0.999996	0.875
House pre_mig	1.143514	0.744
House post_mig	2.994687	(0.003)**
access to health services	0.526061	(0.032)**
Heavy luggage items causes resettlement difficult	0.890065	0.693
small household resettle quickly	2.390899	(0.007)**
IDP rest-cost		
Agree	1.400974	0.378
Neutral	1.934556	0.199
Disagree	1.35454	0.544
strongly disagree	0.68199	0.35
Homes destroyed/completely/partially	2.197507	(0.018)**

Odds ratio analysis offers important new perspectives on the elements affecting internally displaced people's (IDPs') resettability. Assessed alongside several independent variables, each of which presents a different angle on the resettlement decision-making process is the dependent variable, willingness to resettle. With a p-value of 0.227 and an odds ratio for the constant term of 0.18341, the chance of resettlement is not much changed. With a p-value of 0.607 and an odds ratio of 0.811647, the presence of militancy or terrorist groups indicates a minor unfavorable association—but not statistically significant. With p-values above 0.05, consumption patterns both before and after migration produce odds ratios of 0.999984 and 1.000024, respectively, both of which indicate no appreciable influence on resettlement decisions. Support from UNHCR/WFP, on the other hand, stands out with an odds ratio of 0.558881 and a p-value of 0.044, implying that people who got help are 55% less likely to seek resettlement because of the supposed stability given by outside support.

With a very significant p-value of 0.00 and a quite low chances ratio for finding work in the place of origin at 0.284721, This shows that households with limited work possibilities are 72% less likely to think about resettlement. With an odds ratio of 1.37347 and a p-value of 0.002, current agricultural earnings also play a part and reveal a favorable link that motivates resettlement among people involved in agricultural activities. Regarding household education, primary education corresponds with an odds ratio of 0.417929 and a p-value of 0.027, meaning that homes with less educated members are far less likely to resettle. With an odds ratio of 0.511082 and a p-value of 0.027, access to education for school-aged children in the conflict region exhibits a similar pattern, hence stressing the obstacles produced by insufficient educational resources. Resettlement willingness is much improved by house ownership following migration; this is seen in an odds ratio of 2.994687 and a p-value of 0.003. This implies that households who own a house where they live are almost three times more likely to stay there than to go back to their place of birth. With an odds ratio of 0.526061 and a p-value of 0.032, access to health services also becomes clearly important since poor health facilities discourage resettlement.

An odds ratio of 2.390899 for smaller families emphasizes how family size affects resettlement choices since it indicates they are more likely to resettle fast. On the other hand, households whose homes have been destroyed have a p-value of 0.018 and an odds ratio of 2.197507, suggesting a great chance of unwillingness to go until their houses are rebuilt. Using a logarithmic adjustment of the regression model helps one to manage the limited character of probabilities (from 0 to 1). This change enables a more reasonable study of the log-odds, which can span negative to positive infinity. Interpreting the odds ratios as the exponential of the maximum probability estimates helps one to better grasp the interactions in action.

With important roles played by economic prospects, educational access, housing security, and outside support, the odds ratio analysis shows in general that several elements greatly affect the willingness of IDPs to relocate. Every odds ratio offers a complex knowledge of the difficulties experienced by displaced people and points out areas where focused efforts could enhance resettlement results.

DISCUSSION

Examining survey results from Temporarily Displaced Persons (TDPs) in Waziristan exposes significant socioeconomic disturbances brought about by forced displacement, therefore revealing a complex problem transcending urgent humanitarian needs. The results highlight how strongly ingrained in the economic, social, and psychological well-being of the displaced people forced migration is, not only ephemeral. The findings confirm our theory about the relevance of employment possibilities in the location of origin and expose a statistically significant correlation. reduced likely to consider re-migration to their original sites are households with reduced job possibilities. Furthermore, prolonged displacement has had a major effect on migrant agricultural operations since changes in household attitudes against returning and the prolonged stay away have reduced current agricultural production.

Furthermore statistically significant, with a p-value of less than 0.05, are the results showing access to schooling in the conflict region. The damage of school buildings and infrastructure during the war helps to explain this drop in educational access. But neither the household profession nor present household income showed statistical relevance, nor did the spending on education both before and after migration. The military activities have clearly affected urbanization patterns; house ownership in the displaced area becomes statistically significant post-displacement. Following their forced displacement, most internally displaced people (IDPs) have concentrated in their present locations. Inadequate local health services, which also proved statistically significant (p-value 0.05), are a major obstacle to resettlement noted in the findings. On the other hand, elements like large baggage and resettlement expenses had no statistically significant impact on the resettling choice.

Another important consideration is family size; larger households are less likely to be considering going back to their places of birth. Finally, the willingness to resettle is much influenced by the present situation of homes—that of either destruction or safety. Households whose homes have been devastated are reluctant to go back till their houses are once more livable.

The survey's quite startling findings include the notable drop in consumption among displaced households. According to the data, many TDPs have seen a significant drop in their household income; many of them also report losses that have heightened their economic fragility. Conflict

combined with the disturbance of local economies has drastically reduced job possibilities for these families in their native localities as well as in the places where they were moved. Many TDPs have thus been in a vulnerable situation, mostly depending on social support networks and humanitarian relief for their fundamental necessities. This dependence draws attention to a crucial problem: TDPs lack economic resilience, hence reconstructing their livelihoods presents long-term difficulties.

Apart from the financial consequences, the poll results highlight the negative influence of displacement on educational level among TDPs. Many of the respondents said that the turmoil and instability brought about by forced migration had greatly reduced their capacity for pursuing education. Well-documented is the relationship between income and education, hence the reduction in educational possibilities for TDPs aggravates their financial difficulties. These people suffer obstacles to employment without enough education, therefore extending a cycle of poverty and need on outside help. Their capacity for upward mobility and self-sufficiency is undermined by their lack of access to educational resources as well as by the insecurity of their housing circumstances.

The poll also emphasizes TDPs' restricted access to labor markets at their new sites. Many displaced people battle to find work because of things like prejudice, lack of local ties, and inadequate skills fit for the job openings. Given the reliance on humanitarian help, which might not be long-term sustainable, this situation is very alarming. TDPs' low employment opportunities add to their despair and dissatisfaction, therefore aggravating their capacity to reintegrate into society and reconstruct their life.

It is clear from the study that a complicated interaction of socioeconomic, psychological, and environmental elements shapes the willingness of TDPs to return to their home places. Although many TDPs say they want to go back, their choices are sometimes eclipsed by major security and availability of necessary service issues. The possibility of repatriation is less tempting since the continuous instability in their original areas causes worries of more violence or disturbance. Furthermore, the lack of vital infrastructure like education and healthcare reduces their confidence in going back home as these elements are so important for the future of their family.

Those who own homes or have family links—that is, those with closer ties to their land—are usually more likely to think about going back to their native locations. But the hard reality of instability and the collapse of local economy frequently temper these goals. For these families, the psychological and emotional toll of displacement as well as the worry of going back to a volatile surroundings produce a difficult decision-making process.

As many families have moved to metropolitan areas looking for greater access to jobs, healthcare, and education, the poll results also highlight a trend toward growing urbanization among TDPs. This trend emphasizes the long-term effects of forced migration on metropolitan environments and helps to explain demographic changes in surrounding cities. Urban places appeal mostly to people because of the seeming availability of resources and possibilities absent in their rural equivalents. This migration pattern, however, also begs questions regarding urban areas' capacity to handle the flood of displaced people, hence perhaps taxing already few resources and services.

Furthermore, the way TDPs live is much shaped by the creation of new social networks in metropolitan settings. Existing communities can provide displaced families with support so they may negotiate their new situation and get necessary services. But the difficulties of urban life—such as high living expenses and employment competition—may also aggravate their financial fragilities.

The results of the study of survey data show the complex and broad effects of forced displacement on TDPs in Waziristan. The findings highlight the critical requirement of thorough treatments addressing not just the immediate humanitarian needs of these communities but also the underlying socioeconomic issues impeding their recovery and resettlement. As these people negotiate the road to recovery, policymakers and humanitarian groups have to take into account these complexity in their attempts to assist TDPs, thereby ensuring that mechanisms are in place to help economic resilience, educational access, and social integration. Fostering lasting resettlement and enabling TDPs to reconstruct their life following displacement depends on such all-encompassing solutions.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION

According to the study, the Waziristan area—especially the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)—has suffered great suffering; forced relocation ranks among the most urgent

problems. The protracted nine-year displacement brought about significant structural changes in the area that showed up as lost agricultural activity, permanent settlements, and commercial businesses. Waziristan had a strong economy prior to military operations starting despite safety issues. With exports reaching worldwide markets, the timber sector, dried fruit trade, cattle ranching, and chromite mining—especially in South Waziristan—helped to drive economic development. The region's people and capital potential was shown by the good functioning of educational institutions and the reasonable enrollment rate.

Households started carefully returning when the government said the area was safe in 2017 and allowed remigration. Two key reasons drove this temporary remigration: to register for government compensation and NGO aid programs and to evaluate their state of their property. Still, the area still has serious problems including security concerns, inadequate healthcare and education, and little job possibilities. These problems impede permanent resettlement of displaced people. The precarious security environment, including roadside bombings aimed at paramilitary forces in North Waziristan, generates uncertainty and anxiety that discourages people from making long-term residence. Furthermore, the extensive destruction of houses during military operations has left many families without suitable living conditions, so preventing their return until rebuilding takes place. The following actions have to be given top priority to guarantee the sustainable rebuilding of Waziristan and the favorable resettlement of displaced people:

Strengthening Security and Stability

The security of the area calls the most immediate attention. Law and order has to be restored by a thorough, long-term security plan that guarantees returning families feel safe. To stop insurgent activity and guarantee public safety, this would call for consistent military presence, community-based police, and intelligence-sharing systems.

Rebuilding Infrastructure and Housing

Resettlement is much hampered by the demolition of houses. By providing financial support via both short- and long-term housing loans, the government must hasten the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure and dwellings. Reconstruction should also include sustainable building techniques to guarantee resistance against next wars. Starting focused economic initiatives will help the area to regain pre-conflict economic vitality.

These should comprise support for small enterprises, incentives for agricultural rebirth, and market reopening—that of timber and dry fruits among other things. Particularly in chromite mining, investment in local mineral discovery and export routes would create jobs and bring cash for the area.

Building Educational and Health Infrastructure

The government has to give the creation and repair of hospitals and educational institutions top importance. Rebuilding the infrastructure of education should concentrate quality, access, and monitoring measures to guarantee consistency. Health services have to be developed and enhanced to serve the returning population as well. Long-term stability and growth of the area depend on these industries.

Employment Generation and Skills Development

To relocate, displaced households require workable revenue sources. To give the returning population employment possibilities, the government should start employment initiatives especially in industries including construction, agriculture, and education. Particularly for young people, vocational training courses can provide them the tools to launch companies or find work, therefore promoting long-term economic stability.

Focusing on security, infrastructure development, and economic regeneration, these policy ideas seek to establish conditions fit for the positive resettlement of displaced people in Waziristan. Restoring the economic possibilities of the area and guaranteeing sustainable growth for its people is the ultimate aim.

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