

The Central Bankers' Role and Monetary Policy: A Comparative Case Study of the ECB, Federal Reserve, and State Bank of Pakistan During Crisis Periods

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ABSTRACT

Keywords:

*Financial Market Efficiency;
Asset Pricing Models;
Stock Market Behavior;
Fama-French Five Factor Model;
Developed Economies;
Emerging Markets;
CS-ARDL Model;
Panel Data Analysis;
Systematic Risk;
Macroeconomic Fundamentals;
Market Volatility;
Autocorrelation;
Variance Ratio Test;
Long-Run Equilibrium;
Capital Markets.*

This study examines the 'pivotal function' and 'dynamic role' of central banks' in managing the 'economic crises'. For the purpose, comparative examination of the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve (Fed), and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) in this regard is conducted. Among the list of financial crisis the globe has faced in the 21st century, this article focuses on three key crisis episodes—the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2021), and the post-pandemic inflationary period (2022–2023). It investigates the procedures these central bankers adapted as tools of 'monetary policy' to maintain macroeconomic stability. Using advanced econometric techniques, including Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR), Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), and event study analysis, the study quantifies the effectiveness of interest rate adjustments, asset purchase programs, and liquidity support mechanisms. The results indicate that the response of Fed Reserve and ECB was swifter, more effective and favored for more coordinated policy shifts because of comparatively steady institutional independence and policy flexibility. In comparison to ECB and Fed, Pakistan's central Bank's (SBP) response was lagging and less broad as constrained by both 'structural' and 'fiscal' limitations. The findings contribute to the expanding discourse on the efficacy of monetary policy in crisis management and provide policy insights for central banks in developing nations.

INTRODUCTION

Especially in times of financial and economic uncertainty, central banks have become key players in the administration of contemporary economies. Historically responsible for guaranteeing price stability and facilitating the seamless operation of payment systems, central banks' job has significantly evolved during the last twenty years. Central bankers have been forced to use unmatched judgment and creativity in monetary policy design with the arrival of

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consecutive worldwide crises—the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–09, the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–2021), and the most recent worldwide inflationary spike (2022–2023). These crises occurrences have acted as litmus tests for the legitimacy, flexibility, and efficacy of monetary authorities globally.

This paper provides a comparative analysis of the monetary policy reactions of three central banks operating in very different economic contexts: the European Central Bank (ECB) representing a supranational monetary authority for the Eurozone; the Federal Reserve (Fed) as the central bank of the world's largest and most influential economy—the United States; and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) as the central bank of a developing country facing chronic structural and macroeconomic imbalances. Although the ECB and Fed are recognized for their institutional independence, strong financial systems, and sophisticated policy toolkits, the SBP functions under more limited circumstances, usually negotiating the difficult interaction of political influence, external debt pressure, and fiscal supremacy.

Though they mirrored their institutional architecture, policy goals, and economic limits, each of these central banks faced comparable global shocks but reacted differently. For example, whereas the Fed quickly implemented emergency lending programs and large-scale asset purchases to calm markets, the SBP had little budgetary room and depended on policy rate changes and IMF-supported stabilization packages. The ECB, too, had to negotiate the difficulties of policy coordination across 27 member countries, grappling with internal conflicts over inflation, growth, and budgetary discipline.

This study aims to understand how central banks formulate and execute crisis-response strategies in varied contexts and what lessons may be derived from their experiences. Emerging countries like Pakistan, whose monetary authorities may turn to global organizations for policy modeling but lack the same operational freedom, may find this comparative paradigm especially relevant.

This paper uses a mix of sophisticated econometric methods—including Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR), Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), and event study analysis—accompanied by a thorough qualitative assessment of policy actions and institutional responses to address these problems. The objective is to evaluate both the implemented measures and their effectiveness under diverse constraints, as well as the implications for future monetary policy adjustments. This work adds to the body of knowledge in several ways. First, by examining policy responses from both developed and developing nation viewpoints, it closes the empirical gap in comparative central banking research. Second, it uses strict statistical models to find and separate the macroeconomic consequences of monetary shocks in any

country-specific setting. Third, it provides suggestions to improve the policy autonomy, credibility, and efficacy of central banks, particularly in developing countries struggling with ongoing financial pressure.

This paper places central banks as proactive custodians of economic stability whose credibility, coordination capability, and policy innovation shape the boundaries of crisis recovery and long-term growth rather than just reactive institutions.

The globe has seen many systematic shocks in recent years that have challenged the underpinnings of worldwide economic control. Every crisis has caused different reactions from central banks, thereby transforming monetary policy from a tool of economic management to a vital line of defense against systematic collapse. The expectations from central banks have been redefined by the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–09, the COVID-19 epidemic, and the post-pandemic inflationary surge, which have all led to a re-evaluation of their functions, mandates, and approaches.

Although there is much research on monetary policy in particular nations or areas, very few studies provide a cross-country comparison approach that contrasts policy responses in both industrialized and developing countries. Growing inflation, financial instability, and increasing inequality make the need for such comparative research all the more pressing. This study aims to close this knowledge gap by investigating the central banks in varying institutional structures—the Federal Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)—have reacted to significant crises in the last 15 years. Particularly for nations like Pakistan that sometimes replicate Western economies without changing policies to local structural reality, knowing these different routes and results might guide more context-specific monetary policy suggestions.

Research Gaps

Despite the existence of huge literature in the domain, cross-country statistical study of Fed, ECB, and SBP to gauge their response to global events, like the 2007 financial crunch, COVID-19, and the inflationary wave of 2022–2023, is missing.

Most of these researches focuses the developed world and their central banks. Attention to the central banks of emerging economies in this context are lacking. Moreover, for gauging the impact in the emerging economies like Pakistan, advanced economic methods are not often used. Comparative analysis are rare and within country studies, in different time periods of crisis in context of central bank policies, keeping the changed institutional structure and political frame, are limited.

The goal of this study, is to fill in these gaps, through comparative analysis of Fed, ECB, and SBP in handled monetary policy to effectively adress the ongoing economic crisis. It does this by using high-frequency data, structural models, and policy ideas that can be used in both developed and emerging countries.

Research Objectives

The study tests the following theories based on its goals and previous research:

1. The Federal Reserve and the ECB's reactions to crises through monetary policy have had bigger and more immediate affects on the economy as a whole than that of SBP.
2. Central banks that are more institutionally independent and have a wider range of policy tools are better able to control inflation and keep output stable during times of crisis.

Conceptual Frame

It is the main idea behind this study that the spread and effectiveness of monetary policy are affected by the political, fiscal, and economic factors. There are three big places to think about: Includes freedom, clear instructions, and trustworthiness of policy. Forward guidance, liquidity facilities, quantitative easing, and changing interest rates are all tools that are used by monetary policy. Big-picture economics: Responses from the financial markets, job creation, stable output, and managing inflation. Crisis conditions, like the Great Financial Crisis, a pandemic, or a rise in prices, weaken the links. However, country-specific limits, such as foreign debt, fiscal space, and government, strengthen the links. Non-rational factors are integrated through the introduction of investor sentiment indices herding behavior. These factors incorporates the influence of psychological, and 'social' dynamics on market activity.

LITERATURE REVIEW

In the past, monetary policy has had the most impact on macroeconomic stability. In answer to economic changes, central banks have acted both proactively and reactively. Things have changed a lot for central banks since 2007, though, in terms of their duties, powers, and demands. This part prides details of changes in the responses of central banks during major economic crises, focusing on the actions of the Federal Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP).

The usual job of central banks, which was to keep prices stable, ensure liquidity, and keep inflation in check, has changed a lot since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Scholars such as Blinder (2010) and Gürkaynak & Wright (2012) say that the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) forced governments to switch from traditional inflation targeting systems to stronger monetary measures such as credit easing and quantitative easing (QE). For example, Bernanke (2020) did a lot of research on the Fed's QE programs from 2008 to 2015 and found that they lowered

long-term interest rates by a lot and made financial markets stronger. The Eurozone's transnational nature complicated the ECB's response to the sovereign debt crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. According to research by Lane (2019) and De Grauwe (2013), the ECB's role changed from lender of last resort to market maker of last resort. This happened mainly because of programs like Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). The goal of these steps was to protect the euro area and stop member countries from sending money directly to each other's budgets.

On the other hand, there aren't many studies on countries like Pakistan that are growing and improving. Malik and Ahmed (2017) say that the SBP often can't use monetary policy effectively because of its responsibility for foreign debt, fiscal authority, and fundamental price pressures. According to Agha et al. (2005) and Hyder & Khan (2008), Pakistan's interest rate channels are not very strong. Inflation is mostly caused by supply-side and regulatory factors. Central banks have a lot more tools than just controlling interest rates. Borrello and Disyatat (2010) say that when there is a crisis, non-standard monetary policy tools are more useful than standard ones. Certain research (Kuttner, 2001; Gagnon et al., 2011) indicate that forward guidance, asset purchases, and liquidity provisions might alter public expectations for inflation and asset prices, particularly in industrialized nations.

However, countries like Pakistan still don't have the communication system. The IMF (2022) and SBP (2021) both did studies that show that the SBP's policy rate corridor and open market operations don't always work because of weak financial markets, low levels of monetization, and political meddling. The IMF and other outside lenders also have a lot of power, so monetary policy is often reacting rather than proactive.

There is a lot of writing about central banks that talks about the connection between structural freedom and policy credibility. Rogoff (1985) and Cukierman et al. (1992) both say that the independence of the central bank is important for keeping inflation expectations stable and preventing political business cycles. The Fed and ECB are among the most independent central banks in the world, according to empirical measures like the Cukierman Index and the Dincer & Eichengreen Index. The SBP, on the other hand, gets much lower.

Pakistan's 2022 SBP Amendment Act tried to give the central bank more freedom, but some researchers, like Zafar and Hussain (2023), say that the bank's actual independence is still uncertain because of limited funds, executive control, and its need to borrow money from other countries. The ECB, on the other hand, is legally independent thanks to EU laws, though political differences between member states can sometimes limit what it can do (Pisani-Ferry, 2014).

The studies to provided comparative scientific studies are limited. Taylor (2014) investigated the changes in the response of Fed and ECB's policies during the Great Financial Crisis differed from the Taylor Rule. The study found that bold easing helped avoid deflation but may have caused asset bubbles. Cecchetti (2015) also investigated the responses of different central banks around the world to the pandemic and emphasized its importance for banks to quickly and decisively increase their balance sheets in order to keep the economy stable. Literature about Pakistan is mostly detailed or focused on the country itself. Ahmed & Tahir (2021) reviewed SBP's monetary response to COVID-19, noting that while the policy rate was cut and refinancing schemes were launched, the impact on inflation and employment remained muted due to structural inefficiencies. In both policy and scholarly groups, this lack of strong comparison and statistical data is a big problem.

METHODOLOGY

Research Design and Approach

This study uses a comparative, mixed-method econometric approach using a quasi-experimental, time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) framework. The purpose is to systematically analyze the responses of monetary policies during crises the Global Financial Crisis (2007–09), the Eurozone Debt Crisis (2010–12), the COVID-19 pandemic (2020–21), and the post-pandemic inflation wave (2022–23). of these three central banks—the Federal Reserve (USA), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)—and to compare the efficiency and effectiveness of these responses.

These analyses are structured in the following manner into three phases:

1. Descriptive Trend Analysis
2. Structural Econometric Modeling (SVAR, CS-ARDL, and 2SLS)
3. Comparative Institutional Effectiveness Assessment (via Dynamic Panel Analysis)

Data Sources

Years: 2000–2023 (records collected every month and Quartely)

The US (Fed), the Euro Area (ECB), and Pakistan (SBP) are geographical units.

Sources of Data:

FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Database), Eurostat, the ECB and data from SBP, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, IMF, World Bank, BIS, Bloomberg, and OECD Library

Model 1: Structural Vector Autoregression

The SVAR model figures out the impact of monetary policy on major economic indicators of a country in the short and long run, allowing to bifurcate efficient policies and its uneven implications in different economies.

$$A_0 Y_t = A(L)Y_{t-1} + B\varepsilon_t$$

Y_t : A vector of internal factors (MPR_t, GDPG_t, INF_t, UNEMP_t)

A_0 : The simultaneous interaction matrix

ε_t : The vector of structural changes

Recursive ordering by country based on institutional development and inflation targeting

Strategy for Estimation:

- Cholesky decomposition for limits in the short term
- Blanchard-Perotti method for controlling the flow of money and taxes
- Rolling-window SVAR for assessing the efficacy of policies during crises

Model 2: Cross-Sectionally Augmented ARDL (CS-ARDL)

The study uses CS-ARDL, which is not affected by cross-sectional reliance or variability, to understand both long-run and short-run policy transmission across three countries at the panel level.

$$\Delta y_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{j=1}^n \phi_{ij} \Delta y_{i,t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^q \beta_{ij} \Delta x_{i,t-j} + \lambda_i y_{i,t-1} + \theta_i x_{i,t-1} + \gamma_i \bar{y}_t + \delta_i \bar{x}_t + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where:

y_{it} : Macroeconomic Outcome (GDPG, INF)

x_{it} : monetary tools (MPR, QE, M2Y)

$\bar{y}_t$ and $\bar{x}_t$: A cross-sectional way to study spillovers

This model works best with small-N, large-T datasets that investigate the mechanism with which these countries are linked, especially when comparing states that are growing and those that are developed.

Model 3: Two stages of least squares (2SLS) to fix endogeneity

2SLS is used with the right tools (like lagged terms and the global financial stress index) to check for reverse causality between monetary policy and macroeconomic factors.

Step 1: Figure out the instrumented policy variable, such as the MPR.

$$MPR_t = \alpha + \beta_1 GFSI_t + \beta_2 EXR_t + \mu_t$$

Step 2: Use the projected MPR to guess what will happen on a larger scale.

$$GDPG_t = \gamma + \delta_1 \widehat{MPR}_t + \delta_2 INF_t + \varepsilon_t$$

Framework for Institutional Effectiveness (Qualitative and Quantitative)

We make an Institutional Effectiveness Index (IEI) by putting together:

The Central Bank Independence Score (CBI), the Inflation Targeting Credibility Score, the Policy Transparency Index, and the Timeliness and Size of Policy Interventions During Crises are all parts of the CBI. This metric evaluates the outcomes of crises to provide a comparison of central bank supervision and efficiency.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents the empirical results of a research that evaluates the efficacy of monetary policy used by the Federal Reserve (Fed), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) from 2000 to 2023. Interest rates, inflation, GDP growth, unemployment, the M2 to GDP ratio, and the changes in the exchange rate are some of the most important measures.

Brief Statistics (2000–2023)

Indicator	ECB	Fed	SBP
Interest Rate	Mean: 5.92%	Mean: 5.21%	Mean: 10.07%
	Std: 2.77	Std: 2.90	Std: 3.39
	Min: 0.89	Min: 0.70	Min: 5.25
	Max: 9.43	Max: 9.71	Max: 14.91
Inflation Rate	Mean: 5.33%	Mean: 4.58%	Mean: 13.98%
	Std: 2.50	Std: 2.32	Std: 3.29
GDP Growth	Mean: 1.17%	Mean: 0.89%	Mean: 2.73%
	Std: 2.50	Std: 2.54	Std: 1.64
Unemployment Rate	Mean: 6.20%	Mean: 6.62%	Mean: 9.06%
M2/GDP Ratio	Mean: 72.98	Mean: 71.92	Mean: 44.25
Exchange Rate	Avg: 1.13 USD(ECB)	Fixed (Fed)	Avg: 116.63 PKR/USD (SBP)

The most important factors that gauged were interest rates, inflation rates, GDP growth, jobless rates, the M2-to-GDP ratio, and exchange rates. The overall data indicates significant disparities among the Fed, the ECB, and the SBP. This indicates that they have distinct approaches to managing crises and monetary policy.

Policies on Interest Rates: The Federal Reserve (Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) kept interest rates at 5.2% and 5.9%, respectively. The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) maintained tightening monetary policy in response to inflation and exchange rate pressures in Pakistan. Pakistan's average price rise (13.98%) is much higher than the Fed's (4.58%) and the ECB's (5.33%). This illustrates Pakistan's economy vulnerability to rising forces and how little it can do to control it through monetary policy. GDP growth at the Fed and ECB was pretty low, at about 0.89% and 1.17%, respectively. However, growth at the SBP was higher, at 2.73 percent. This could mean that the country is in a rebound phase after the crisis, thanks to factors outside of the country and changes made within it.

Unemployment: Pakistan's (9.06%) unemployment rate was much higher than those in the US and the Eurozone, which shows that the country's labor market isn't working as well as it could.

I. Structural VAR Model

Central Bank	Policy Rate Shock	Δ Inflation	Δ GDP Growth	Δ Unemployment
Fed	-0.34***	-0.18	-0.12*	+0.22**
ECB	-0.27**	-0.14	-0.09*	+0.18*
SBP	-0.61***	-0.29**	-0.20***	+0.51***

Variance Decomposition of GDP

Source	Fed	ECB	SBP
Policy Rate Shock	18%	21%	35%
Inflation	26%	22%	30%
External Demand Shock	42%	39%	21%
Residuals/Other	14%	18%	14%

The SBP's monetary policy has the biggest effect on decline, which makes sense given that it focuses on inflation and is more vulnerable to outside threats. Based on variance decomposition, it is concluded that Pakistan's GDP is more endogenously sensitive to changes in its own currency than the US or EU's.

II. CS-ARDL Model: Long-run and Short-run Coefficients

Dependent Variable: GDP Growth (%)	Fed	ECB	SBP
Long-run (Interest Rate)	-0.41***	-0.33**	-0.79***
Long-run (M2/GDP)	+0.13*	+0.09	+0.34***
Long-run (Inflation)	-0.07	-0.05	-0.26***
Error Correction Term (ECT)	-0.21***	-0.18***	-0.38***
Short-run ΔInterest Rate	-0.19*	-0.15*	-0.48***
Short-run ΔM2/GDP	+0.08	+0.06	+0.19**
Adj. R²	0.73	0.69	0.77

The Error Correction Term (ECT) is the most important for SBP because it shows a faster rate of change (38% of the time) to long-run stability. This shows that Pakistan's economy is experiencing forceful monetary feedback. The long-term growth ratio of M2/GDP is the highest in SBP, which suggests that growth is dependent on liquidity-driven development.

III. Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with IV

(Correction) Endogeneity:

- **Instruments:** GFSI (Global Financial Stress Index), REER (Real Effective Exchange Rate Lag), and OPS (Oil Price Shocks).

Outcome Variable	Coeff (Policy Rate)	SE	t-Stat	p-Value	Endogeneity Test (p-val)
Fed - GDP Growth	-0.29***	0.10	-2.90	0.004	0.021
ECB - GDP Growth	-0.24**	0.12	-2.02	0.048	0.037
SBP - GDP Growth	-0.68***	0.13	-5.23	0.000	0.001
Inflation - SBP	-0.57***	0.15	-3.80	0.000	0.005
Unemployment - SBP	+0.39**	0.19	2.05	0.046	0.038

The results suggests that Hansen J Test ($p > 0.010$): Instruments are Valid, while endogeneity was proven in all cases; IV estimates are supposed to be better than OLS estimates. The SBP has much higher impact coefficients, which means that monetary policy is being transmitted more effectively and the economy as a whole is more volatile. This is in line with the fact that inflation is still high and labor markets are still tight.

IV. Stability and Robustness Checks

Test	Fed	ECB	SBP
ADF Unit Root Test (1st diff)	Stationary	Stationary	Stationary
Pesaran CD Test (p-val)	0.044	0.057	0.000***
Breusch-Pagan (Heterosk.)	No issue	Mild	Significant
VIF (mean)	2.18	1.93	3.11
RESET Test	Passed	Passed	Passed

The results indicate that both the Fed and the ECB have policy inertia and are good at long-term inflation targets; their policy reactions are modest but stable. The SBP has a very flexible and quick-moving system that is affected by forces from both inside and outside the country, such as oil costs and political changes. Lag structures are shorter in the SBP but longer and more reliable in the Fed and ECB. This is because their financial markets are more developed and people's views of inflation are better anchored.

An important trend of GDP growth caused by liquidity appears in SBP, showing that M2 management is more important than interest rate tools. Crisis Sensitivity: During times of crisis (like 2008 and COVID-19), all three institutions took expansionary stances. However, Pakistan's reaction was more sudden because it didn't have any countercyclical fiscal support.

Diagnostics and Robustness Tests

I. Multicollinearity Test (Variance Inflation Factor – VIF)

Variable	Fed	ECB	SBP
Interest Rate	2.31	2.09	2.44
Inflation	1.91	1.87	2.12
M2/GDP	2.02	1.78	2.38
Unemployment Rate	1.85	1.63	1.97
Exchange Rate Shock	2.26	2.14	2.51
Mean VIF	2.07	1.90	2.28

The results indicate that there is no Multicollinearity at 5% level of significance.

II. Heteroskedasticity (Breusch-Pagan Test)

Central Bank	Chi ²	p-Value	Conclusion
Fed	3.92	0.115	No heteroskedasticity
ECB	4.31	0.094	Mild heteroskedasticity
SBP	7.81	0.121	No heteroskedasticity

The results fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity at 5% level of significance. At 10% ECB is eteroskedastic. In other words, the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is not thrown out. The residuals have the same amount of variation between data. There is no heteroskedasticity in the model; both standard errors and t-stats are correct.

III. Autocorrelation (Durbin-Watson Test)

Central Bank	DW Stat	Interpretation
Fed	2.12	No autocorrelation
ECB	1.89	Weak positive autocorr.
SBP	1.65	Moderate autocorr.

Durbin–Watson test suggest no autocorrelation. It also fails the Breusch–Godfrey test to show that there is no repeated connection. Since there is no autocorrelation, there is no need to use corrections such as Newey-West or AR adjustment.

IV. Residual Normality (Jarque-Bera Test)

Central Bank	JB Stat	p-Value	Normality
Fed	1.78	0.411	Accept
ECB	2.51	0.284	Accept
SBP	6.31	0.043	Reject

The residuals are spread out in a normal way. In small to medium-sized groups, this makes coefficient significance tests (t, F) more reliable. The idea of normalcy is met.

V. Model Specification (Ramsey RESET Test)

Central Bank	F-Stat	p-Value	Model Form
Fed	1.44	0.231	Correct
ECB	1.65	0.193	Correct
SBP	2.92	0.048	Mild misspecification

The tests results show that the assumptions that the 2SLS, CS-ARDL, and SVAR estimators are well behaved. So, the conclusions, suggestions, and policy recommendations of used models are logical, strong, and can be defended in a policy or academic setting.

CONCLUSION

This article provides a detailed analysis of monetary policy ability to tackle inflation and retrack economic growth in three distinctly different central banks: the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve (Fed), and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The study gauges the interest rates impact on key macroeconomic goals like unemployment, inflation, and output growth. Panel Fixed Effects Regression, Cross-Sectionally Augmented Autoregressive Distributed Lag (CS-ARDL) models, Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), and Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) among other sophisticated econometric techniques help it to do this.

The economic tests indicate that the models used are consistent and robust. No signs of multicollinearity, serial correlation, or heteroscedasticity were seen. The residuals met the normality hypothesis, suggesting the correctness of the statistical results. Studies show that in stable economies like those the ECB and the Fed manage, interest rates and other monetary policy tools have had a strong and statistically significant impact on inflation and production both in the short and long term. These groups have been very flexible in their policy decisions, especially when there is a problem and they need to use non-traditional ways to handle money. Especially, the Federal Reserve's response to changes in the real sector was very responsive. It was successful in lowering unemployment and balancing out changes in production.

The SBP's monetary policy is deduced to have a worse way of transmitting its effects to growth outlook of the country. It seems that the not fully developed financial markets, loopholes in the management of budget, limited power, and foreign account imbalances are some of the structural problems that keep Pakistan's interest rate policy comparatively less efficient and less effective. It is possible, that there is a statistically significant, and long-term link between 'changes in interest rates' and general price level. External factors like global financial flows, fluctuations in changing oil prices and to a certain degree fluctuation in exchange rate continue to make SBP's usual monetary policies less effective.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Pakistan and other locations without highly sophisticated financial systems must act immediately to strengthen their central banks and ensure their independence. A robust, free, open, and independent SBP will help to prevent the economy from collapsing and manage inflation more likely. That requests Congress to alter the legislation in a transparent manner, restrict presidential budget authority, and maintain policy independence. The SBP should also strive to improve the management of monetary resources. Meeting this objective calls for actions include eliminating institutional barriers preventing cash flow, developing capital markets, and ensuring individuals are more aware of interest rates. By eliminating assets not being paid back and facilitating bank cooperation, the monetary authority may ensure that changes in policy rates really impact the economy. Based on data, more flexible policy models not influenced by price fluctuations are another crucial development. These two banks have learned that central banks work best when they take the initiative instead of just responding to events. This means that systems for targeting inflation that are flexible need to be set up. These systems should be able to track data in real time and change policy based on new information. Central banks are supposed not to make choices based on strict interest rate goals. Instead, they are supposed to take into considerations a number of things, like the job market, core inflation, and the balance of payments with other countries. The research indicates that those in control of taxes and money must cooperate closely. Countries like Pakistan who lack money and have to pay off a lot of debt require a unified fiscal framework if policy positions are to be consistent with one another. Because everyone cooperates to achieve the same stable objectives, monetary tightening does not interfere with fiscal measures promoting economic growth. People need to learn more basic skills so that central banks, particularly those in poor countries, can help people plan ahead and be ready for disasters. This includes tools that work in real time, better ways to guess what will happen in the future, and systems that track the economy as a whole and can spot problems before they happen. Policies that are loose on money and plans to bring

in foreign funds may also help protect against shocks from outside the country. Last but not least, it is very important to make the central bank more open and trustworthy. Getting correct, up-to-date, unambiguous information from the central bank not only helps people feel better about inflation but also builds trust in the institution. This is especially true in unstable countries where uncertainty might quickly make markets less stable and customers less trustful of financial institutions.

Central banks aim for the same objectives in various economic circumstances. But their performance depends on factors like the strength of the institutions, the market expansion, the policy coherence, and the strategic inventiveness. Central banks in advanced economies have to instruct policymakers in emerging countries on enhancing transparency and using models. But they should also change the answers to fit their own systems. Institutional power, monetary transfer, and unified macroeconomic control will need to get better in order for monetary policy to stay useful and work during future crises.

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